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Background image: Child EO victim in Svatove, Luhansk region.
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assessment conducted in 2018 and 2019,5 highlights the crucial incapacities of the primary VA duty-bearers in Ukraine and puts forth the
corresponding lessons learned.
The needs of child EO victims are at the center of our analyses
of local VA capacities. Danish Refugee Council-Danish Demining
Group’s (DRC-DDG) internal database6 shows 2,060 casualties (resulting from 1,126 incidents) from June 2014 to September 2020; 151 of
these were children. Picking up, tampering with, and playing with
EO—behaviors characteristic of children—is the third most frequent
known cause of EO casualties in Ukraine. Children from povertystricken regions are regularly attracted to EO in order to sell them
for scrap metal or souvenirs.7 The impact of hostilities on educational
infrastructure remains on the rise: some fifty conflict-related incidents
have been reported in 2019. When compared to 2018, this constitutes
a nearly 200 percent rise.8 The presence of military forces within a
1-kilometer radius of educational facilities as well as the infrastructural destruction caused by the ongoing conflict forces some children
to cross the EO-ridden contact line every day to attend classes.9
Although full clearance is years away, Ukraine is making tangible
progress. It has joined important mine action- and VA-related conventions and ensures basic rights to its population through its constitution (and related social protection laws).10 Ukraine has also adopted the
Law of Ukraine “On Mine Action,” hereinafter referred to as the mine
action law (MAL), on 6 December 2018. Ukrainian Parliament has
recently adopted an amendment to MAL (Draft Law No. 2618, adopted
on 17 September 2020). However, as of December 2020, it has not yet
been signed by the President of Ukraine.11 To a certain extent, interagency communication and coordination on VA exist with social proChild EO victim in Svatove, Luhansk region.
Image courtesy of © UNICEF / Filippov / 2019.
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tection units, sanatoriums, rehabilitation centers, and regional-level
hospitals currently serving as essential VA intermediaries. Ukraine is

ix years into the protracted crisis, explosive ordnance (EO)

also steadily implementing the state-wide inclusion reform (i.e., “The

contamination continues to affect Ukrainian communities.

New Ukrainian School”), improving access to education for children

Consequent to the conflict between the government of Ukraine

with special educational needs. Finally, the government is open to and

and the so-called de facto authorities in the Donetsk and Luhansk

cooperative with the international mine action community. As a result,

regions, EO affects an estimated 7,000 square kilometers of land in

DRC-DDG was able to holistically assess the remaining VA gaps.

government-controlled areas (GCAs).1 Even without complete data

The assessment took international policies and guidelines as the

from the non-government-controlled areas (NGCAs), Ukraine ranks

theoretical background for its research. These included the UN

among the five most affected places in the world for EO casualties.2

Policy on Victim Assistance in Mine Action12 and the United Nations

But for EO victims3 the path forward remains fraught with difficul-

Children's Fund (UNICEF) Guidance on Child Focused Victim

ties. According to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS),4

Assistance.13 DRC-DDG used these as a framework for the design

victim assistance (VA) requires a long-term commitment, a responsi-

of the assessment, thereby covering the following topics: laws and

bility that state institutions bear. The present article, encapsulating an

policies, data collection, emergency and continuing medical care,
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more in-depth study was beyond reach. The lack of a nationallyowned, EO-casualty database additionally hampered the identification of potential interviewees. Regardless, the DRC-DDG
assessment—supported by the German government and United
Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF)—continues to
be the only review of national Ukrainian VA capacities.

GAPS IN UKRAINIAN NATIONAL VA CAPACITIES
Laws and Policies. The root cause for many VA incapacities
emerges from the underdeveloped legal environment. For any
national provision, governments are required to adopt necessary
laws, secure budgets, and develop policies, regulations, and procedures. For VA in Ukraine, this is yet to become the case. For
years, the Ukrainian response remained ad hoc, uncoordinated,
and misaligned with best practices from abroad. Not until late
2018, did the government adopt MAL;19 as of December 2020, its
implementation remains troublesome. For VA, two significant

Figure 1. Accumulated Data on VA Assessment in Ukraine.
Figure courtesy of © DRC-DDG.

challenges exist in the Ukrainian legal framework: unenforced

rehabilitation, psychological and psycho-social support, and socioeco-

existing provisions and gaps within them.

nomic inclusion (focusing on education). For this article, we found it

The current version of MAL provides for a number of services

pertinent to also share drawbacks and lessons learned about conduct-

to EO victims but lacks the crucial legal documents, by-laws, and

ing VA assessments. Finally, we have adjusted the terminology of the

procedures for its implementation. For instance, MAL secures

article to conform with IMAS 13.10 Victim Assistance (First Edition),

rights to medical, psychological, professional, and social assistance

published earlier in 2020.14

for all EO victims; 20 however, there is no complex system or protocol for the general provision of VA at the state level. 21 Officials

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

Thus, EO victims either receive assistance at the discretion of local

approach, including secondary data analyses as well as qualitative and

administrations, or simply do not. Many crucial legal documents

quantitative research tools. In the first stage (2018), the team used a

(e.g., a national mine action strategy) are also missing. Finally, by-

questionnaire (with multiple choice, open-ended, yes/no, and Likert-

laws (i.e., procedures, orders, and directions) required to provide a

type questions)15 for household interviews with parents or caregivers of

framework for a national mine action authority and national mine

child EO victims and semi-structured key informant interviews (KIIs)

action center are absent. Crucial gaps in the existing legislation are

for institutional VA stakeholders. Although difficult to locate EO vic-

likewise commonplace.

tims due to stigma, fear, and the lack of a database recording casualty

Even where the current MAL is implemented and necessary pro-

data, snowball sampling16 was used to reach fifteen parents or caregivers

cedures are adopted, certain gaps weaken the state’s VA capabilities.

of seventeen child EO victims (from one to seventeen years old) while

For one, there is no provision on data collection. Unless defined in

duty-bearing VA service providers (n = 52) were gathered from three

MAL, such data collection is both legally controversial and halts the

levels: national, regional, and local.17 For triangulation, secondary data

coordination of responsible state bodies. Furthermore, MAL does not

analyses were performed using institutional and internal DRC-DDG

prescribe the adoption of a national mine action strategy or an action

sources as well as a desk review of related reports from other humanitar-

plan; without these, national VA is undermined. What is more, the

ian and development organizations. The second stage (2019) focused on

state allocated a budget line for mine action activities only in 2019

national educational capacities for child EO victims. Here, too, house-

and 2020 (approximately US$185,000). While a separate line on “spe-

hold and KIIs were utilized to contact fifty-four interviewees (twelve

cialized assistance on prosthetics and rehabilitation” (approximately

children, twenty-two teachers, and twenty caregivers) using a purposive

US$1 million) was included, it is insufficient for the needs of the ben-

sampling18 (see Figure 1). For both stages, the two regions of Luhansk

eficiaries. Such a lagging legal environment is the common theme for

and Donetsk were chosen due to the frequency of child EO accidents (see

many of the national VA capacity gaps discussed next.

Figure 2). Although the assessment aimed to be comprehensive, certain
limitations are noteworthy.
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are obliged to act exclusively as defined by national regulations. 22

The two-stage assessment employed a mixed-method research

Data Collection. The problematic EO casualty data collection is
not limited to Ukraine as mirrored by examples in countries such as

Capacity assessment was constrained by timeframes and wide geo-

Afghanistan, 23 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 24 and Vietnam. 25 Similarly,

graphical spread, availability and quality of data, as well as demograph-

the establishment of a reliable and complete EO casualty data col-

ics. Each stage of the assessment lasted for three months; however,

lection system in Ukraine is in process. Currently, Ukraine has

the conflict-affected areas stretch over 427 kilometers. The nature of a

no central agency in charge of the latter, neither is it mentioned in

small-sized team, as well as safety and logistical issues, meant that a

MAL. The state capacity to evaluate the scope of required assistance
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Figure 2. Reported child EO casualties in Ukraine (June 2014 - September 2020).
Figure courtesy of © DRC-DDG.
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is further thwarted by the fact that healthcare facilities did not identify EO injuries under the International Classification of Diseases26
at the onset of the conflict (only in 2018 was a protocol introduced
obliging them to do so). As a result, EO victims injured before 2018
face difficulties proving the cause of injury when trying to obtain support. Without a comprehensive victim information system (VIS), it is
likewise impossible to accurately quantify the cost of conflict-related
disabilities to individuals, the economy, and society at large. The state
is hence not only limited in ensuring compensation and assistance for
the current EO victims but also in accurately evaluating VA needs for
the future.
Emergency and Continuing Medical Care. While emergency care
is oftentimes provided at local and district levels, it is the expense of
continued medical care and a lack of specialists and equipment that
remain problematic and disproportionately affect rural areas. The
majority of interviewed victims requiring continuing medical care had
to transfer to regional hospitals; lacking external support, many EO
victims and their families continue to struggle with such transitions.
Moreover, there exists a general shortage of specialists and equipment
to treat EO-related traumas in conflict-affected regions. In some of the
assessed cases, this led to errors in treatment and the deterioration of
victims’ conditions. But as noted by the World Health Organization
(WHO), for the EO victims and their families it is currently “impossible to assess the quality and capacity of medical facilities in Donetsk
and Luhansk regions because of subjective perceptions of quality.” The
biggest deficiencies have been identified in rural areas due to the long
distances that need to be travelled to access adequate medical facilities. This is further exacerbated by the fact that most EO accidents in
Ukraine occur in rural areas among a population that is more economically fragile.27
Rehabilitation. Rehabilitation in Ukraine has gaps in individual
planning, full-cycle prosthetic provision, informational awareness,
and state-assigned budgeting. All EO victims with physical disabilities
interviewed received an individual rehabilitation plan (IRP), informing them of access to rehabilitation facilities and prosthetic services.
Yet, these plans have rarely been made concrete in practice. EO victims
also faced difficulties receiving relevant rehabilitation due to omissions or inaccuracies in IRPs. Thus, no interviewed EO victim was
availed the full cycle of prostheses: preparation, adjustments, maintenance, and replacement. The procedures for obtaining such assistive
devices are not interlinked. As a result, prostheses provided to children are exclusively cosmetic rather than functional. While functional
prostheses would provide children with increased mobility, they are
more costly and require periodic changes. Their provision and application is also highly specialized and tailored. Fitting would require
multiple trips to regional hospitals, making it even more inaccessible
for low-income families. Additionally, a reluctance among social protection specialists to fully inform families of rehabilitation services is
customary due to a lack of funding. “If the government aims to save
money, there will obviously be less incentives to inform families of
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government is normally enough to cover one rehabilitation session
annually; however, a child usually needs four.
Psychological and Psycho-Social Support. Ukrainian child EO
victims are not supported by an established system of psychological
aid or qualified professionals, with distrust for such services prevalent among the population. While MAL asserts rights to psychological and social aid to every EO victim, the majority of them fall short
of its full extent. Of the seventeen assessed cases, only eight received
psychological support. It was rendered either as generic psychological
assistance or therapy at a hospital, emergency psychological counselling post-accident, or as psychological therapy in sanatoriums during
rehabilitation, at their schools, or by a non-governmental organization (NGO). Without an established system of psychological aid, rehabilitation and other psycho-social assistances are provided solely from
local resources. As expressed during our interviews with national and
international NGOs and governmental stakeholders, the latter lack
the requisite professional capabilities, as most psychologists operating
in eastern Ukraine do not have experience in counselling trauma and
are uncertain of their ability to provide such counseling. A further
problem is the distrust of psychological counselling, caused by both
the underestimation of psychological risks and burdens as well as the
costs of such services. It is, therefore, common for families (as well as
doctors, teachers, and social workers) to be prejudiced against psychological assistance, underreport their need for it, and reluctantly
recognize it as a priority. “He became more reserved and aggressive
… No, we are not going to contact a psychologist, we do not need it,”
mentioned one mother.
Socioeconomic Inclusion. The assessment focused particularly
on the educational environment to identify gaps in child EO victims’
socioeconomic inclusion. While most of child EO victims continued
with education within one-to-three months after the incident (30 percent and 25 percent of interviewees, respectively), those with more
severe injuries had to drop out due to ongoing medical care for at least
six months to more than a year. Some children faced additional difficulties in their learning due to loss of skills as a result of severe traumas
or amputations. Likewise, legislation remains to be fully implemented
providing children with disabilities the same opportunity as their
peers without disabilities. Despite a state-wide inclusion reform in the
educational system, teachers from conflict-affected areas still reported
a lack of knowledge, skills, and information on working with children
with disabilities and no relevant training on inclusion in schools.
Consequently, teaching staff and administrators are sometimes not
ready or unwilling to include children with disabilities in their classes.
Moreover, there are few (extracurricular) activities for child EO victims due to the absence of afterschool activities at schools, generally,
and the lack of conditions and accessible facilities for children with
disabilities, specifically.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VA CAPACITY BUILDING
IN UKRAINE

the available services,” stated an interviewed child protection expert.

Laws and Policies. Improving the legal environment for VA will

Finally, state funding for the rehabilitation of children is limited. As

necessitate amending MAL and its corresponding legal documents,

reported by social protection specialists, the amount provided by the

assigning an evidence-based budget, and bolstering the legal support
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Emergency and Continuing Medical
Care. Emergency and continuing medical
care for EO victims in Ukraine requires
capacity building of medical staff, supervision of EO victims, and allocation of funds
for travel expenses. To boost the specialist
knowledge of doctors, a coordinated plan
for their capacity enhancements ought to
be developed and implemented. Training
will need to be registered and monitored for
refreshment and assessment of continued
needs. Since families tend to put less priority into continued medical care, individual
supervision of EO victims by medical staff is
highly recommended. Medical staff should
be aware of cases where ongoing treatment
is required, and efforts should be made on
both sides (caregivers and medical institutions) to ensure that child EO victims
receive all necessary care. Due to frequent
long-distance travel required for continuing treatments, the allocation of state funds
could bring much-needed financial relief to
EO victims and their families.
Rehabilitation.

In

terms

of

reha-

bilitation, we recommend an improved,
full-cycled,

tailor-made,

and

needs-

based VA system. The current model5
should be replaced by an improved ver-

Child EO victim in Svatove, Luhansk region.
Image courtesy of © UNICEF / Filippov / 2019.

sion in the provision, care, and main-

to the state. Functional changes to MAL include, inter alia, develop-

tenance

ing a legal status for EO victims, introducing the necessary procedures

experience and featuring a broader array of technologies. Furthermore,

at all VA stages, and establishing specialized state bodies to lead the

a full-cycle, coordinated methodology for the registration and follow-

national VA response.28 More data-driven budget allocations would

on care of EO victims ought to be put into place and linked with

also be crucial. Lastly, it would be beneficial to dedicate adequate

records from other types of assistance provided (i.e., psycho-social,

resources to legal VA (and mine action) capacities within the gov-

financial). The rehabilitation for EO victims also needs to be personal-

ernment to identify further gaps in legislation and help develop the

ized. Patients should be supported from the initial injury all the way

required legal acts.

through recovery to exiting the system. A dedicated case manager

of

prostheses,

aligned

with

international

Data Collection. There is an acute need to put into place a stan-

should act as a focal point for each family so the process is streamlined

dardized and centralized collection of EO casualty data given the

and lessens the burden on the EO victims. Finally, EO victims need

many issues that arise from its absence. For this, a state policy should

to receive equal prioritization for treatment as those injured by other

be developed and integrated with clear terms and with a distribution of

means: support should be needs- rather than cause-based.

responsibilities among the relevant stakeholders—as is the case in, for

Psychological and Psycho-Social Support. Psychological and

example, Cambodia. Such a database should be sex, age, and disability

psycho-social support requires coordination, governmental strategies,

disaggregated, including causes of injuries and incidents from earlier

awareness raising and advocacy, as well as a needs-based approach.

stages of the conflict. It is important to include data on incidents that

Lessons learned from other countries29 would be useful in developing

have taken place in NGCAs to ensure that victims have access to assis-

a coordinated support system for EO victims in Ukraine. A dedicated

tance in GCAs. As a result, it would be possible to amalgamate, verify,

governmental strategy and an allocated budget would ensure access to

and report on the incident data via a centralized database and populate

higher quality psychological treatment. To counteract the reluctance

a VIS. Statistical information from such a national database should be

for this support, more awareness raising and advocacy of its impor-

available upon request to all relevant mine action and VA stakeholders.

tance in the post-traumatic treatment process should be garnered

This will help better identify EO victims, assess the complexity and

among national duty-bearers (especially schools in eastern Ukraine)

extent of VA needs, and aid further analyses.

and the general public. Lastly, ongoing counselling and psychological
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support for EO victims should be identified as part of the overall
rehabilitation and social inclusion plan for each victim and regularly
reviewed throughout their path to recovery.
Socioeconomic Inclusion. The four main recommendations for
improvements in the social and economic inclusion of EO victims
are special approaches to education, capacity building of teachers,
disability-centered extracurricular activities, and awareness raising. It
is necessary to specify the particular learning objectives for EO victims
comparative to their peers without disabilities; to establish individual
training or online learning during their treatment; and to ensure their
greater involvement in programs befitting their needs, including vocational assistance to enhance their employability. Since the response of
teachers to the needs of EO victims fundamentally affects the quality of education and the environment at schools, supporting programs
(such as inclusion training) for teachers and children ought to be
implemented to build their technical and practical capacities. Regular
awareness raising for parents, children, communities, and state representatives to broaden their knowledge on appropriate attitudes
towards children with disabilities would also be beneficial. “People on
the bus would avert their eyes upon seeing them so my children asked
me to buy them balaclavas,” explained a parent of child EO victims.
For the conflict-affected Donetsk and Luhansk regions, further efforts
are likewise required in the development of specialized extracurricular
programs as well as sporting and recreational facilities for EO victims
and other people with disabilities.

CONCLUSION: FUTURE VA ASSESSMENTS
Taking into account various international policies and guidelines,
the assessment of Ukraine’s VA looked at (1) gaps in the underpinning
legal environment, (2) data collection, (3) emergency and continuing
medical care, (4) rehabilitation, (5) psychological and psycho-social
support, (6) and socioeconomic inclusion. However, given the limitations of the present assessment, more in-depth studies are recommended for particular segments of VA in the future. For example, it
would be pertinent to assess the socioeconomic impact of accidents on
child EO victims. The formative years in which child EO victims experience the incidents call for the identification of educational, career,
and life prospects of children post-accident. Moreover, a more detailed
look at the psychological impact of the armed conflict on the entire
social strata would inform VA specialists how to better address
psycho-social and psychological consequences. A further inquiry into
the rehabilitation, prosthesis, and orthotics systems is likewise deemed
key, especially for alignment with IMAS on VA (including physiotherapy, assistive devices, and occupational and speech therapy).
Additionally, we recognize that future assessments of medical capacities ought to be conducted by medically-qualified personnel and
benchmarked against good practices as illustrated elsewhere.
See endnotes page 66
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